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Economics and Clean Water
The Uncertain Search for Environmental Quality. By Bruce A. Acker-
man & Susan Rose-Ackerman, James W. Sawyer, Jr., Dale W. Hender-
son. New York: The Free Press, 1974. Pp. x, 386. $13.95.
Reviewed by William J. Baumolt
One of the great paradoxes of public decisionmaking is the contrast
between the economists' evaluation of their own areas of knowledge
and the places in which they have proved influential in public policy.
Their GNP forecasts are eagerly solicited, and their views on inflation
policies are usually consulted before decisions are arrived at, even
though in both areas disagreements are frequent, and their occasional
admissions of ignorance and uncertainty are as justified as they are re-
freshing. Yet in areas such as environmental policy where economists
speak almost with one voice and with a high degree of confidence,
their counsel rarely creates a ripple and has yet to produce a single
case of significant influence on federal or local policy.
The authors of this very excellent book, The Uncertain Search for
Environmental Quality,1 have examined in great and illuminating de-
tail the unhappy story of the program for the purification of the Dela-
ware River, which is an illustration of this state of affairs. It is a tale
which does involve a role for economic analysis, or rather for a cost-
benefit analysis, carried out by a group referred to by the authors as
"the technocrats." However, the programs ultimately put into effect
are about as inconsistent as one can get with the policy prescriptions
favored in the economic literature.
The volume, an outstanding piece of interdisciplinary work involv-
ing the expertise of lawyers, economists, and natural scientists, perhaps
most clearly falls within the areas of public administration and poli-
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tical science. It represents, as the product of extensive research and
documentation, a careful description and evaluation of the sequence
of events and the organizational and political forces that led the Dela-
ware program to a condition as unfortunate as the book judges it to
be. The authors make a strong case. Even operated ideally, the pro-
gram as designed promised benefits which were likely to be negligible
-a slight reduction in the transportation time necessary for fishermen
to reach good fishing areas, with no improvements in the quality of
boating, no likelihood that the water would become suitable for swim-
ming, and certainly no significant benefits for public health. The
book concludes that "these benefits seem trivial in comparison to the
costs we have estimated the ... program will impose." 2 Moreover, the
program was organized in a manner that promised neither effectiveness
nor efficiency. Strong evidence is provided showing a variety of re-
spects in which it has broken down altogether or will incur costs well
above the minimum required to achieve the program's objectives. The
evidence even offers a strong presumption of inequity in the treatment
of similar producers, something the designers of the program appar-
ently strove very hard to avoid.
Much of the book is devoted to a cogent analysis of the shortcomings
of the arrangements for the control of the program. For example, it
examines carefully the regional character of the problem, the fact that
the pollution of the Delaware burdens the residents of at least four
major cities, many smaller municipalities and at least three different
states. Accordingly, the design of the program was left ultimately to
four Governors (Hughes of New Jersey, Rockefeller of New York,
Shafer of Pennsylvania and Terry of Delaware) and Stewart Udall,
the Secretary of the Interior. The authors conclude:
Our study shows that when five state and national politicians are
asked to serve intermittently in a regional agency, they will not
make any effort to understand the distinctively regional implica-
tions of the issues before them. Instead ...each of the five pol-
iticians will ask himself which of the programs will best further
his interest in the state or national forum that is his primary con-
cern. To make matters worse, because all of the decision makers
spend virtually all their time and energy handling state or federal
problems, they will look for advice primarily from the state or
national aides on whom they ordinarily rely and only secondarily
from those bureaucrats ... who have attempted to view the dis-
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Significant conclusions such as this are based on interviews with a
wide-ranging sample of the actors (both those with principal and mi-
nor roles), on painstaking examination of the data, and on careful
reconstruction of the events and their sequence.
However, rather than pursuing these matters further, I want to re-
vert to my initial theme-the standard advice of economists and the
ways in which current policy conflicts with it. I will discuss two issues
in particular-the choice of the priorities of environmental programs
and the selection of instruments to carry them out.
One of the great curiosities of environmental policy has been the
relatively low priority assigned to toxic substances and other serious
hazards to human life and health. In the Delaware program, for ex-
ample, the prime criterion of environmental improvement has been
the dissolved oxygen (DO) content of the water. Dissolved oxygen
content does have some significant consequences for water quality,
and its widespread use as one element in the evaluation of water
quality is certainly defensible. However, over a considerable range,
improvement in DO may accomplish little other than make the water
more hospitable for fish. It will not suffice to make the water safe
for swimming, and "[i]f turbidity is reduced as a result of a BOD 4
clean-up campaign, the algae may be in a perfect position to multiply.
Increasing DO may simply mean that the valley is trading a brown
river for a green one."5 "And one that will smell when the algae
begin to die." 6
More important, the absence of "disease-carrying organisms and toxic
chemicals ... is not assured by high DO levels." 7 Thus, the program
which is expected to cost more than half a billion dollars is expected
to do virtually nothing to control the discharge of poisons into the
river. It is difficult to disagree with the authors' conclusion that
[t]he most important problem in the Delaware River is not DO
but the discharge of exotic chemicals and metallic compounds
which may well be dangerous to human beings when they are
present, even in small quantities, either in drinking water or in
food.... Given the real (if unquantifiable) possibility of serious
harm . . a risk-avoidance strategy appears warranted in which a
Poison Control Board should be given a strong statutory mandate
4. BOD, biochemical oxygen demand, is a measure of the oxygen depletion produced
by an emission into a waterway. The depletion occurs through the consumption of
oxygen in the oxidation of the wastes.
5. P. 27.
6. P. 27 n.20.
7. P. 27.
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to outlaw or stringently limit the discharge of any substance
which there is reason to believe may significantly injure human
health.8
Unhappily, the strange ordering of priorities is by no means confined
to this case. For example, in the case of air pollutants from vehicular
emissions, the relative severity of restrictions on the different emis-
sions by no means corresponds to the evidence of their dangers. Federal
legislation on the control of poisonous substances in general is still
in a fairly rudimentary state, and the programs are far less compre-
hensive than those for the improvement of water quality. As the
Council on Environmental Quality states in its annual report for
1974, "[u]rgently needed Federal authority to deal with toxic sub-
stances has been proposed by the President but has yet to be enacted
by the Congress."" There are as yet no federal standards and few local
controls on the use of toxic PCB (polychlorinated biphenyls) in fluor-
escent lamps, television sets, capacitors and generators which find their
way into every household, threatening cancer and reproductive failure.
Hundreds of pounds of PCB are poured directly into waterways, from
which it enters the food chain and imbeds itself into the tissues of
man and animals.
Relatively little is done about a number of science fiction-like but
nevertheless very real environmental dangers. A noteworthy example
is the disposal of wastes generated by nuclear power plants. The lethal
radioactive emissions generated by such wastes will continue to be
very substantial for tens and perhaps even hundreds of thousands of
years! Yet man has devised no containers for them which can be
relied upon to last more than a century or two. We certainly cannot
afford to dispose of them in the oceans or even in deep caves which
are very likely to undergo geological disturbances in the course of
the long periods in question. The absurdity of current policy on this
subject is illustrated by an official admonition to dispose of these
wastes in sparsely inhabited areas, as if anyone can foresee which lo-
cations will have few inhabitants a century from now. No wonder
the decision to undertake the construction of nuclear plants has been
called a Faustian bargain. Yet these horrendous perils play a minor
role, if any at all, in the decisionmaking process.
Our scrambled priorities are not easily explained. Certainly many
more businesses, and indeed the more powerful ones, are affected by
a war on BOD than by a program to control toxic emissions. Perhaps
8. P. 209 (footnote omitted).
9. FIrTH ANNUAL REPORT OF TilE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 151 (1974).
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the problem is that the public is most strongly concerned by pol-
lutants it can see or smell. Whatever the reason, it seems clear that
a careful reexamination of priorities will offer society far more for
the money it expends on environmental improvement.
The Delaware experience illustrates another major and widespread
shortcoming of current environmental programs-their reliance on
direct controls or on what the authors describe as a "legal orders"
regime.10 Under this standard approach, each polluter is told precisely
what modifications in his activities are required if he is not to be
subject to punishment. He may, for example, be told to install a
specified type of water purification equipment. Or, in water quality
programs, he is frequently given an emissions quota specifying a
maximum amount that he is permitted to discharge of each regulated
pollutant. On grounds of fairness usually, these quotas approximate
equal percentage reductions from initial emissions levels (with all sorts
of modifications and exceptions granted to allow for special circum-
stances). To economists, the ancient lineage of this approach does
not render it immune from charges of gross inefficiency, ineffective-
ness, and even inequity. It is clearly inequitable for firms A and B
each to be told to reduce its emissions by 40 percent if A had pre-
viously been civic-minded and had voluntarily instituted a control
program of its own, while B had proceeded on the principle that
the public be damned. It is also inequitable if A manufactures a
product whose pollutants are cheaply and easily removed while B's
product line permits it to do so only at enormous cost.
But inequity is not the main reason for economists' distrust of the
legal orders procedure. They believe it is ineffective because it is
dependent upon the vigilance of the regulator, something that may
well prove very transitory. Its effectiveness depends on the prompt-
ness with which orders are issued, the severity of their provisions,
the strength of the regulator's resistance to demands for modifica-
tions, his effectiveness in detecting and documenting violations, his
vigor and success in prosecuting them, and the severity of the penal-
ties imposed by the judicial mechanism. It can be shown that the
performance of environmental agencies on many of these counts has
not been inspiring, at least so far, and one may well doubt that it
is likely to improve spectacularly as public excitement over the issue
begins to dampen. Instead, economists recommend more widespread
use of the price mechanism, in the form of taxes on emissions or
the sale of pollution permits at the maximal prices which a bidding
10. Pp. 225-26, 228.
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process can extract from polluters. These depend not on the watch-
fulness of the regulator but on the reliable tenacity of the tax col-
lector. They work by inviting the polluter to avoid his payments
through the loophole deliberately left to him-the reduction of his
emissions.
In the economists' view, this approach is more effective than legal
orders for another reason. The latter proceeds by designating a thin
line between vice and virtue. If polluter A is told to reduce his wastes
by 100,000 pounds per day, he is in effect declared a good citizen if
he removes 100,000 pounds, and a lawbreaker if he merely eliminates
99,900. Thus he is offered motivation to meet his quota, but none to
go the slightest bit beyond it even if he can do so with little cost
and effort. A tax on wastes, on the other hand, offers a reward that
is continuous and has no arbitrary terminus. The more the polluter
decreases his emissions, the larger the tax payment from which he
is exempted.
Perhaps most important, the economists' approaches offer a large
bonus in efficiency. They work for reduction of emissions to be un-
dertaken preponderantly by those who can achieve them at least cost.
At a tax of four cents per pound, firm A which can reduce emissions
at a cost of 1.5 cents per pound will find it very profitable to do so,
while firm B for which such reductions cost 10 cents will find it
cheaper to pay the tax. Thus, if tax rates are set high enough to
achieve their overall goals for, say, a waterway, they will do so far
more cheaply than a program of legal orders with its approximately
uniform quotas. If the available evidence is to be believed, the cost
savings can be as high as 50 percent of the total, a matter of no minor
interest to consumers.
All this and much more is discussed most illuminatingly in the
book reviewed here. The authors are careful, incidentally, not to
oversell the economists' approach; they point out its limitations and
some circumstances in which other methods may be more promising.
The volume can be regarded as many things-a careful and illuminat-
ing case study, a suggestive work on public administration as it ap-
plies to environmental programs, and a fine piece of economic anal-
ysis. But perhaps it serves above all as a searching examination of
the processes through which profound irrationalities can find their
way into public policies.
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On Guilt, Responsibility and Punishment. By Alf Ross. Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975. Pp. x, 183. $10.00.
Reviewed by Thomas H. Morawetzt
I
In Samuel Butler's Erewhon,1 persons who commit antisocial acts
are treated for pathology. Erewhonians think of them as socially 'ill' in
the way we think of persons who are physically ill. There is no ques-
tion of blame or responsibility. Butler's fantasy is tantalizing because
it is like such other skeptical suggestions as that what I regard as wak-
ing life may be a dream or that other persons may lack subjective
consciousness just as plants and rocks lack it.2 The notable feature of
skeptical suggestions is simplification; the distinction between waking
and dreaming or the distinction between persons and objects is erased.
Butler's story is skeptical insofar as it dissolves the distinction between
responsible and intentional action, on the one hand, and mere nonin-
tentional events (such as the happening of illness).-
Skeptical stories become philosophical arguments by adding the
claim that the eliminated distinction is unjustified or even meaning-
less, and that we are to expunge it from thought and action. But to act
as if waking life is a dream, I must be able to regard waking life as a
dream, and it is far from clear what this involves. This points to a
general strategy for handling skeptical questions. The strategy is not
to show that they are illogicial or inconsistent; rather, the attack is
two-pronged. The first step is to show that the skeptic's suggestion is
impracticable (cannot be practiced). The second is to show that it is
impractical-that if it were practicable, there would be nothing to be
said for implementing it.
The theme of Alf Ross's new collection of essays, On Guilt, Respon-
sibility and Punishment, is that certain Erewhonian recommendations
f Associate Professor of Philosophy, Yale University.
1. S. BUTLER, EREWHON OR OVER THE RANGE (1872).
2. The problem is discussed by philosophers as the problem of other minds. See, e.g.,
A)er, One's Knowledge of Other Minds, in ESSAYS IN PHILOSPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 346 (D.
Gustafson ed. 1964); Malcolm, Knowledge of Other Minds, in id. at 365.
3. Actually, Butler retains and reverses the distinction: although individuals are not
responsible for harm-causing acts, they are responsible and are held to blame for physical
illness.
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in criminology are impracticable and impractical. The book is doubly
interesting: the issues are important and widely discussed, 4 and Ross's
strategy of argument, as I have already hinted, points beyond these
issues. The major issues and arguments of the book are presented
full-dress in .essays three through six. Here Ross discusses and opposes
the following familiar Erewhonian arguments:
(1) The aim of punishment is to prevent crime; all means are to be
adopted to-the extent that they serve this end. Retribution is not an
aim of punishment, and theories of retribution rest on the indefensi-
ble notion that only those who are morally responsible for crimes are
to be punished and punished only to the extent of their responsibility
(essay three).
(2) The notion of punishment, like that of retribution, is itself un-
tenable. It should be replaced with the notion of treatment, aimed at
cure, and of prevention by "precautionary measures, aimed at ren-
dering the offender socially harmless" 5 (essay four).
(3) An important theoretical argument is at the basis of arguments
(1) and (2). Human action is causally explainable (by way of psycho-
logical causes, social causes, etc.) and is causally determined. It is in-
compatible with this 'scientific truth' to speak of responsibility for
action, which presupposes freedom (indeterminateness). All such
morally freighted notions rest on a mistake (essay five).
(4) A succinct way of making point (3) is this: to hold A morally
responsible is equivalent to saying "He could have done otherwise."
If his behavior is causally determined, we cannot say "He could have
done otherwise," and so we cannot say he is responsible (essay six).
The four points are one continuous argument, and (3) is its heart.
Ross's counterargument is both abstract and practical. He uses two
strategies. He shows that the deterministic argument (3) and its sub-
arguments (1) and (2) contain confusions and fallacies. In addition, he
shows that the determinist's recommendations are impracticable, can-
not be practiced-that is, we cannot think about behavior in the way
the determinist says we must think. Ross does not differentiate between
the two strategies, and I am not sure how he sees their relationship.
Both seem to me necessary. The first alone is entirely negative; it is
not an argument in support of the indispensability or adequacy of
ordinary ways of regarding actors as responsible; it simply shows what
is wrong with one kind of attack on these ordinary ways. The second
4. See, e.g., J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING (1970); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY (1968); T. HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS (1969).
5. A. Ross, ON GUILT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT 67 (1975) [hereinafter cited by
page number only].
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is an argument about indispensability, but without the first strategy,
it suggests a dilemma. For if the incompatibility claim of thesis (3) is
correct and yet cannot be practiced, we are in the untenable situation
of having to think in ways that are logically impermissible. Therefore
Ross needs both strategies.
II
Let's look at what I call the strategy of practicability. We can make
the strategy clear by looking at an example from Kant's Critique of
Pure Reason.6 Kant asks us to consider the fact that persons think of
objects as existing in space and time. Call this proposition (a). It is not
a logical truth, like 'x = x,' whose denial is a self-contradiction. It is
not a psychological truth, like the fact that persons rarely remember
events from their first three years. We can imagine what it would be
like for a psychological truth to be false, but what would it be like
for objects not to exist in time and space? And it is not an empirical
truth of any kind, for how could we find evidence against it? Kant
says that the truth of (a) is a synthetic truth known a priori, a neces-
sary truth of experience generally, a feature constitutive of experience.
Some contemporary philosophers7 would make the same point by say-
ing that it is like a rule in the practice or game of thinking and acting;
it is not possible to act and think without treating objects as existing
in space and time. It is a distinctive feature of the 'internal's aspect
of acting and thinking.
We can make a similar argument about responsibility. It is not a
matter of logic, or a 'mere' psychological fact, or an empirical con-
clusion that some persons are responsible for their actions and others
not. Rather, it is not possible to think of action without using this
distinction, because it is not possible to think of ourselves without
it. Ross makes the point not in the way I am doing, by looking at
an impossible thought experiment, but by saying that the distinction
is unavoidable in applying any system of norms.9 Any legal system,
even modified along determinist lines, is still a normative system.
The institutional application of norms, Ross argues, inherently in-
volves approval and disapproval. 10 While it is possible for a non-
6. I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 65-91 (N. Kemp Smith transl. 1929). Tle ar-
gument in question is from the section called "Transcendental Aesthetic."
7. See, e.g., L. NVTTCENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (3d ed. 1967).
8. See pp. 22, 25-26.
9. P. 121.
10. "But it is not possible to bring a normative system's demands to bear on an of-
fender, and so not just talk about but in the directive language of law and morality,
without this amounting to an expression of disapproval." P. 37 (emphasis in original).
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official to take an 'external' stance by describing conformity or non-
conformity to rules without expressing approval or disapproval, it is
not possible for an official-a judge, for example-to do so. In penal-
izing nonconformity, he unavoidably has the conviction that the of-
fender was responsible, that he assaulted the rules of shared society and
did so voluntarily."' Moreover, a judge cannot think in the same way
of an actor who has caused harm accidentally or inadvertantly or
through madness. Such a person is not the proper object of disapproval.
Ross relies heavily on claims about psychology and emotion in
replying to the determinist. 12 His view is close to such so-called
'emotivist' moral theories as that of Charles Stevenson, theories which
hold that the essence (emotive meaning) of moral language is to ex-
press approval and disapproval. 13 He is also close to J.L. Austin, who
puts approving and disapproving among the "illocutionary forces" of
language, pointing out that persons use language to describe and in-
form and at the same time to warn, praise, disapprove, etc.' 4 But this
dependence on emotivism is the weakest part of Ross's argument be-
cause it makes him vulnerable to the following rebuttal: the fact that
we cannot judge without disapproving is a contingent fact about how
we think, and it is a characteristic of thought which will dissipate as
determinism is culturally digested, just as the fact that men in the 16th
century could not think of the earth as moving around the sun was a
contingent fact and a contingent predicament. With time and change,
rules of behavior may come to be applied without prejudice and with-
out the taint of disapproval.
How can Ross reply to this? He has a reply-a strong one I think-
but only if he gives up his distinction between emotion and cognition.
Ross, we have seen, links the idea of responsibility to the emotive
aspect of norms. His argument is weak to the extent that we can speak
of legal norms being applied ("You are found guilty as charged")
without the emotive aspect of disapproval. Even if we have to dispense
with such emotionally charged disapproval-words as 'guilty,' we can
conceive of officials doing the job of classifying persons without dis-
approving. The cognitive job (the determination of fact) seems separ-
able from the emotive one.
Ross's argument is stronger in a different form. The cognitive job
11. Pp. 125, 127.
12. This is an important feature of Ross's criticism of the jurisprudence of H.L.A.
Hart. While Hart speaks of the "internal aspect" of rules, he persists in defining law
formally, as the conjunction of primary and secondary rules, without referring to the
internal aspect.
13. See, e.g., C. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944).
14. See J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962).
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is not just any job of classifying, but the job of classifying persons who
are said to have committed harm by their actions. The argument in
its strong form is that one cannot think of agents as persons without
thinking that the question "Did they act freely and intentionally?" is
essentially relevant to an understanding of the action. Indeed, the
judge cannot think of his own actions as events to which that question
is irrelevant.' 5 Ross's point can be made in this way without mention-
ing emotion and without asserting that judging has the illocutionary
force of disapproving. To be sure, the cognitive matter is also a matter
of 'feeling'; it is spontaneous and perhaps unavoidable to feel anger
and resentment at intentional harm-doers.' 6 My emendation of Ross
is that his point is best made in terms of cognition-cum-feeling and not
simply in terms of emotion.
This conclusion points to a deeper difficulty with Ross's methodo-
logical assumptions. Repeatedly he scorns the suggestion that the
principle of responsibility is inherent in our "common moral con-
sciousness ' ' 7 and says that "the question of the conditions of respon-
sibility ... can only be answered on the basis of a certain normative
system."1 8 This is misleading. As I understand him, Ross is echoing
the emotivist (or positivist) claim that a normative system or moral
system may have any substantive content whatever. 19 Under this argu-
ment, it follows that the substantive feature, namely, of assuming
the relevance of presuppositions about responsibility and freedom
can be said to be a feature of the particular moral systems which
happen to underlie our legal practices. But this is a much weaker claim
than Ross is or should be making. The feature in question is distinctive
of normative (both moral and legal) thinking in general. It is not like
the feature of valuing certain kinds of property in certain kinds of
ways, which is a contingent or accidental feature of a value system.
Rather it is a feature which such a normative system must have to
be recognizable as a normative system.
III
I have stressed the practicability argument because it is as elusive as
it is interesting and original. Equally important in Ross's treatment
15. A very similar argument about the concept of a person is offered in P. STRAwsoN,
INDIVIDUALS ch. 3 (1959).
16. See P. STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT 4-5 (1974).
17. Pp. 119-20.
18. P. 29.
19. Emotivism is associated with positivism and is a form of noncognitivism. The
basic assumption is that normative systems, as for example moral and legal systems, have
no natural or necessary content. Rather, their content is simply conventional.
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is a second strategy of dissecting the mistakes and fallacies in points
(1) through (4). Ross gives a thorough discussion of causal determinism
and the ascription of responsibility to show that they are compatible.2"
This is followed by a demonstration that the claim "He could have
acted otherwise" does not preclude causal determination and causal
explanation of the action, but only precludes some kinds of explana-
tions. 21 With regard to punishment, Ross offers a taxonomy of different
questions about the aim of punishment, and he argues that the notion
of retribution is relevant to questions about the justification rather
than the aim of punishment. This is a negative condition: punishment
is justifiable only where the agent is the proper object of censure
(i.e., of 'feelings' of retribution).22
The strategies I have mentioned are directed against the theoretical
version of the determinist argument summarized in points (1) through
(4). Ross is aware of, and responds to, a practical version which is more
or less independent of theory.23 This is the recommendation that we
exclude judgments of responsibility in making harm-doers "clutchable"
by law,2 4 and that treatment be fitted to the causal factors of the
particular case. Ross reviews the practical defects of this suggestion,
many of which are familiar from other writers.2-5
IV
I have not yet discussed the first two essays. The first is an impres-
sionistic essay on the psychology of guilt; the second is a potpourri of
parts of arguments from the longer essays. At least one section of
chapter two, several pages long, is repeated almost word-for-word in
chapter five.20l The problem is general; the book, a collection of papers
which appeared originally in Danish and which were written for var-
ious occasions, is badly edited and repetitive. The argument is broken
into short subsections with pungent headings, sometimes to the effect
20. See essay five in response to point (3).
21. See essay six in response to point (4). See also J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 123 (J. Urmson & G. Warnock eds. 1961).
22. See essays three and four in response to points (1) and (2).
23. The practical argument is, however, considerably weakened by the failure of the
theoretical argument.
24. That is, liable to treatment or punishment. The term is used by Feinberg in
discussing the suggestion that inquiry into the mental state and blameworthiness of an
offender be postponed until after a preliminary determination that the individual has
committed an illegal act and has thus "forfeit[ed] his right to determine his future by
his own choice." J. FEINBERG, supra note 4, at 265. Ross and Feinberg are both re-
sponding to suggestions made by Barbara Wootton in B. WOOTTON, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND
SOCIAL PATHOLOGY (1959).
25. E.g., J. FEINBERC, supra note 4; H.L.A. HART, supra note 4.
26. Pp. 25-27, 110-12.
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that a particular view is self-contradictory or absurd. Ross's style, in
translation at least, is dry but clear.
Ross is the author of several influential books in practical philosophy
and jurisprudence over three decades. Like his contemporary, H.L.A.
Hart, he is concerned to remedy the defects of formal legal positivism
as inherited from Hans Kelsen.2 T For both of these critics of Kelsen,
law is best understood not as a formal structure of rules which specify
norms and sanctions, but as an institution in which there are char-
acteristic internal attitudes of participants. Ross goes further than
Hart in stressing the internal aspect and in dissociating himself from
positivism. Responsibility and punishment are topics which are par-
ticularly well-suited to this approach. These essays are conservative in
a literal sense; they are not politically conservative, but they argue for
the clarification and preservation of much that is useful in our institu-
tions and ways of thought.
27. See, e.g., H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Russell pub. 1961).
Marshall the Man
John Marshall: A Life in Law. By Leonard Baker. New York: Mac-
Millan, 1974. Pp. x, 845, with illustrations. $17.95.
Reviewed by J. Allen Smitht
John Marshall is a figure whose personality has been obscured by
his achievements. The brilliance, clarity, and austerity of his opinions
present Marshall as the aloof, esteemed Great Chief Justice. Too
easily lost behind such an image is the reality of the man. It is ap-
propriate, then, that a new biography should now appear by an ac-
complished writer, Leonard Baker. Each generation needs a study of
Marshall's life to describe his intriguing career with contemporary
interpretation.
The book is especially timely, since it appears as the country be-
gins to celebrate its bicentennial. In 1776, Marshall, who was 21 years
of age, did not rank with Jefferson, nor with Hamilton, who was
soon to become Washington's dashing aide. Marshall is, however, a
Founding Father, though one born out of time; it was only in 1801
that he began to make his contribution to the development of the
American legal system as we know it today.
Baker has had the opportunity to study the Marshall papers at
the College of William and Mary, papers that are being edited for
publication by the Institute of American History. He has reevaluated
material available at Harvard and has benefited from family lore re-
counted to him by some of Marshall's descendants. The Baker book
represents a remarkable fact-gathering effort, the more valuable for
its presentation of those facts in an engaging and easy manner. It
is very much within the genre of the traditional historical biography,
interplaying a chronological narrative of Marshall's life with the
political and social events of his time, and emphasizing Marshall's
not inconsiderable participation in many of those events. Into this
narrative Baker occasionally interjects himself as the omniscient nar-
rator, emphasizing, apologizing, and criticizing, all with the perspi-
cacity provided only by the passage of time.
If Professor of Law, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey.
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The Baker book succeeds excellently within its scope. A major con.
tribution is the division of Marshall's life into four discrete careers:
Marshall as soldier, as lawyer and politician, as diplomat, and as judge.
The three formative careers constitute almost half of the book. By de-
scribing in detail Marshall's activities in his three earlier careers,
Baker prepares us for the final and outstanding role of Marshall as
jurist. Weaknesses of the book as conceived are few. Baker is admit-
tedly a friendly biographer, and his admiration for Marshall's role
in American history is unashamed. Only occasionally does Baker al-
low this admiration to become a bias. The principal examples are the
treatments of Marshall's attitude toward slavery, his enmity toward
Jefferson, and his economic acquisitiveness.
The primary criticism of Baker's book is directed not at what the
book does, but rather at what it does not do (and, in fairness, does
not attempt to do). The book does not contain an exciting and imag-
inative analysis of Marshall, the man. No biographer, including Baker
and even Beveridge,' has yet written an account that can rank with
Dr. Johnson's Life of Savage2 or Lord David Cecil's Melbourne.3 Al-
though it would be foolish to attempt to divorce a person of Marshall's
stature from his achievements, the public needs a biography that
not only presents the facts, but also interprets them in a manner which
illuminates Marshall's personality. No one yet has succeeded in in-
terpreting through Marshall the problems of power and personality,
to use Professor Harold Lasswell's phrase4-interpretations that Camp-
bell5 and Professor HeustonO provided through the English Lord Chan-
cellors. As a result, Marshall has become a figure larger than life. As
Beveridge observed:
[S]o little has been written of his personal life, and such exalted,
if vague, encomium has been paid him, that, even to the legal
profession, he has become a kind of mythical being, endowed with
virtues and wisdom not of this earth.
7
The neglect of the personal side of Marshall's life is attributable in
large measure to the plethora of material on his judicial opinions.
1. A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (Riverside Press 1929).
2. 2 S. JOHNSON, Savage, in LIVEs OF THE ENGLISH POETS 93 (World's Classics 1956).
3. D. CECIL, MFLROURNE (1954).
4. See H. LASSWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY (1962); WoRLD REVOLUTIONARY ELITES
(H. Lasswell & D. Lerner eds. 1965).
5. J. CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND (1881).
6. R. HEUSTON, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS 1885-1940 (1964). See Smith, Book
Review, 21 RrcrEEs L. REv. 179 (1966).
7. 1-2 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL V (1916).
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The principal writers are interested mainly in what Marshall did
with his power once he established a Court with prestige. Most of
them cannot resist summarizing the issues in the leading decisions
and commenting at length on each one of them.
In order to get to the man, the student must read not only Baker's
book but several other biographies and papers as well. From a literary
point of view, most of these writings are of rather high quality. There
is, first, the indispensable biography by Beveridge,s followed by the
classic by Corwin. 9 Next should come the two most recent biographies:
Baker's and the study published in 1964 by Samuel J. Konefsky'0 on
the relationship between Marshall and Hamilton. Three other earlier
biographies can then be added, those by Loth," Palmer,12 and Ma-
gruder.13 These selections can be followed by four good essays, those
of James Bradley Thayer,14 Holmes, 15 Henry Cabot Lodge,1 and
Frankfurter. 7 Although there is necessarily some repetition in these
books and articles, each author establishes his own perspective; the
reader who goes through all of them will not be bored. Less detailed
accounts of Marshall's life are provided in the recent biographies of
Washington' and Jefferson.' 0 Finally, the surveys of the history of
the Supreme Court by Warren 20 and Myers2' are good, entertaining
reference works, although the latter book uses a considerable amount
of socialist bombast in arguing that Marshall was a powerful instru-
ment of the oppressor class. A reader needs all of these writings to
sift out the biographical data on which to base a satisfactory portrait
of Marshall as a man. The following sketch outlines some of the fea-
tures that should be included in a full scale portrait.
An effort to understand Marshall's personality may profitably be-
8. A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 1.
9. E. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION (1919).
10. S. KONEFSKY, JOHN MARSHALL AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON (1964).
11. D. LOTH, CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE GROWTH OF THE REPUBLIC (1949).
12. B. PALMER, MARSHALL AND TANEY: STATESMEN OF THE LAW (1939).
13. A. MAGRUDER, JOHN MARSHALL (1888).
14. J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL (1901).
15. Holmes, John Marshall: Remarks on a One-Hundredth Anniversary, in JAMES
BRADLEY THAYER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND FELIX FRANKFURTER ON JOHN MARSHALL
(M. Howe ed. 1967).
16. Address by Henry Cabot Lodge, John Marshall Day, Feb. 4, 1901. The entire
speech appears in 2 J. DILLON, JOHN MARSHALL: LIFE, CHARACTER, AND JUDICIAL SERVICES
(1903).
17. Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217 (1955).
18. 1 J. FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON (1965).
19. F. BRODIE, THOMIAS JEFFERSON: AN INTIMATE HISTORY (1974).
20. C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1922).
21. G. MYERS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1912).
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gin with an examination of the influence of his father. Thomas
Marshall was a successful frontier farmer in Virginia and a manager
of some of the lands Lord Fairfax owned in the Great Neck region.
When Thomas Marshall married into the Randolph family, he ac-
quired at least tenuous connections with the gentry of the Tidewater.
In a society built on strong class ties, John Marshall, the son, unlike
his self-made father, was born with the right mark on his forehead,
although he was 20 years old before he ever visited a household of
true affluence and power.
Perhaps because of his mother's responsibilities with 15 children, of
whom Marshall was the eldest, he looked to his father for guidance.
The father's principal influences on the son were two: first, he led
his son to embrace an unwavering belief in Federalism as personified
by George Washington-with whom Thomas Marshall had surveyed
some of the Fairfax estate, and for whom he had developed a hero
worship during the French and Indian War;2 2 and second, the father
gave John Marshall the best education that the provincial colony could
provide. Father and son read at home together from a small collection
of classics, including their favorite, Pope. At 14, Marshall went to an
academy for the usual classical course. Later he went to the College
of William and Mary, where he attended lectures for a short period
during the Revolutionary War while he was still on active duty. His
best teacher was George Wythe, who signed the Declaration of In-
dependence and who also taught Monroe, Clay, and Jefferson.
The Marshall family was nominally Christian, but the decadence
of the Virginia clergy of the time,23 together with deistic notions
that competed with the broad churchmanship of the period, led Mar-
shall to express political rather than religious fervor. This lay religion
was translated into Federalist politics, simplified into a belief in a
strong central government, a loyalty to the colonies as a whole and not
principally to Virginia, and a commitment to anything that General
Washington might propose (mostly notably evidenced by Washington's
less than subtle pressuring of Marshall to run for Congress).2 4
22. L. BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE iN LAW 6 (1974) [hereinafter cited by page
number only].
23. P. 751.
24. Washington, then well into retirement, had hoped to stay out of politics, but
gradually had decided that he should recruit new blood into Congress to support his
views. Washington had watched Marshall develop, knew his reputation as one of the
ablest Federalists in the country, and decided that Marshall was his man. At first Mar-
shall refused, giving as his excuse his commitment to the practice of law. But, a day
later, when Washington "moved from entreaty to 'a peremptory and angrily expressed
command,'" Marshall accepted the charge, ran, and won by a narrow margin. 4 J. FLEX-
NER, GEORGE WASHINGTON 423 (1969).
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When the Revolutionary War broke out, both of the Marshalls
entered the army as rapidly as possible-the father as a major, the son
as a lieutenant. The service in the army solidified and further devel-
oped the predisposition John Marshall had acquired as a boy on the
farm with his father. His war experience was not unlike that of
Holmes in the Civil War. For both men, wartime service strengthened
their support of the nation against state and regional interests. In
the war young Marshall also met Washington and his aide, Hamilton.
Marshall found in the General the hero that his father had brought
him up to revere and to whom he looked to transform the colonies
into a nation.
Throughout Marshall's life, most people who knew him thought
that he possessed two qualities in abundance: intelligence2 5 and
charm.2 6 Everyone, including Marshall himself, knew that he had a
first-rate mind. Only a few men, such as Hamilton, Jefferson, and
John Adams could compete with him. Even Daniel Webster said that
he had never met a brighter man.2 7 Nonetheless, his mind had its
limitations. Holmes believed that Marshall got his main ideas from
Hamilton and the Federalist Papers.28 These ideas, of course, can be
traced back through a line of theorists. But even if Marshall developed
some of the Federalist positions concurrently with Hamilton, Mar-
shall was not a John Locke. Marshall's mind, trained primarily in
logic and what was then referred to as oratory, exhibited clarity of
style in both the written and spoken word. Marshall could see and
define the main issues; he could argue from strength. His mind was
not diffuse, nor is there any suggestion of unusual intuitive ability.
His associates thought that he had a superior mental apparatus, but
one that differed in degree, not in kind, from other able men of affairs.
After his intelligence, Marshall was known for his personal charm.
In Richmond, where he made his early success, six or seven members
of the bar ranked with the best lawyers in New York and Philadelphia,
though Richmond was but a small boom town. These men were as
proud as they were able and certainly would have closed ranks against
a newcomer, however talented, who appeared brash. Instead, in Mar-
shall's case, they made room for him and helped him in his phe-
nomenal rise. Later, when he ran for Congress as a Federalist, his vic-






28. Holmes, supra note 15.
29. P. 312.
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When he became Chief Justice, Marshall led the Court, at first
perhaps because some of the other Justices had long held similar
views; but his leadership continued later as Madison began to make
appointments. His influence with Joseph Story is perhaps the best ex-
ample of Marshall's combination of intelligence and charm. Madison
appointed Story to the bench because he was an active Republican-
Democrat and opponent of the Federalists. Upon taking his seat, Story
began his first serious study of the Constitution under the tutelage
of Marshall. As a result of this endeavor Story became converted to
many of Marshall's ideas and began a long career in jurisprudence
in which he was to become a memorable figure in his own right.30
Marshall's biographers have not discovered moral blemishes on his
character, or even those eccentricities that accompany the abilities
of most men of mark.3' In Marshall's case, though he lived in an age
of personal invective, there are few hints of even indecorous behavior
on his part.32 While it is true that he and others were burned in
effigy after the Burr trial, even the most radical Jeffersonian realized
after the acquittal of Chase that Marshall could not be impeached
merely because of his political views, and there was no other ground
on which his opponents could attack him.
3 3
The more one reads of Marshall, the more likely one will find
him a hero; yet one asks if there are not some frailities to round out
his humanity. Three suggestions come to mind-thoughts that might
30. It is wrong to regard Story as a toady to Marshall. Story's later work at Harvard
demonstrated his own great abilities. See, e.g., J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURIS-
PRUDENCE (3d ed. 1843).
31. Professor Heuston's recent studies of the Lord Chancellors of England provide
material on those judges and administrators that is somber, pathetic and even bizarre.
See R. HEUSTON, supra note 6.
32. At one point Marshall showed a spirit of glee over the embarrassment caused to
Jefferson by the publication of witty, scurrilous verse about Jefferson's alleged liaison
with a slave woman at Monticello. Someone in turn suggested that Marshall might also
have been intimate with one of his slaves, but this rumor quickly died, an unsuccessful
riposte. F. BRODIE, supra note 19, at 355.
33. Justice Samuel Chase was one of the many Federalist judges who came under
attack by Jefferson's Republicans in the first decade of the 19th century. They thought
him a good initial target for impeachment because of the unpopularity of his political
statements from the bench and his conduct of several vindictive sedition and treason
trials. But his Senate impeachment trial in 1805 resulted in acquittal.
In 1806 Jefferson became convinced (with some justification) that Aaron Burr was
attempting to precipitate a war with Spain over Mexico and to establish a separate
government in the states west of the Allegheny mountains. In his capacity as Justice,
Marshall granted a writ of habeas corpus to tvo of Burr's accomplices. Sitting as trial
judge in Richmond he bound Burr over to the grand jury on the misdemeanor charges
of violating the neutrality laws and released him on bail. In each case he found in-
sufficient evidence of treason. The grand jury included an indictment for treason, but
at trial Marshall ruled inadmissible practically all of the evidence against Burr. Upon
Burr's acquittal, Marshall was a target of furious attack by Republican politicians and
newspapers. See pp. 417-518; C. WARREN, supra note 20, at 269-315.
The Yale Law Journal
be of some interest to future biographers.
First, Marshall's personality lacked the introspective side that fre-
quently goes with genius. Certainly men in the public arena would
not be there if they were constantly questioning their beliefs. But
there is no evidence to suggest that Marshall, once he achieved man-
hood, ever asked himself whether his basic outlook was right, wrong,
or somewhere in between. There was never the possibility of an about-
face at middle age.
Second, there is Marshall's preoccupation with property, evidenced
by his acquisition of the Fairfax properties in the Great Neck and his
determination to hold onto them at almost any cost.34 Even while
Chief Justice, he wrote a biography of the life of Washington, hoping
that it would be a best seller which would help him pay off his debts.
35
It must be emphasized that Marshall was honest in his dealings. In
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee30 and Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee,
37
the two cases that indirectly upheld Marshall's interest in the Great
Neck land, Story did not write the opinions as a sycophant. Moreover,
Marshall's business judgment was in fact excellent. The complaint
would be that Marshall's interest in property exceeded mere acquisi-
tiveness and bordered on obsession. No one objects to the fact that
Brandeis and Hughes earned fortunes in the practice of law. They
even have our admiration for it. These jurists, however, surrendered
their interests in the marketplace to increase their freedom as deci-
sionmakers. Moreover, while on the bench, Brandeis sought to analyze
and to control untoward acquisitions of wealth and to explore subtly
the problem of the allocation of governmental power; Marshall, who
well understood economic and political problems of his time, remained
glued to the interests of his party. He was not above the party of
property; rather, he led it.
The third disappointment that comes from a study of Marshall's
life is the lack of magnanimity-indeed the implacable hatred-in his
relationship with Jefferson. It is possible, of course, that the relent-
lessness of the antagonism between the two mental giants may have
been the fault of Jefferson, or that each was equally intransigent.
Whatever the case, it is regrettable that these leaders could not un-
derstand that the nation would develop a continuing dialectic for
which the two points of view set the foundation. It is painful to
contrast the feelings between Marshall and Jefferson with those be-
34. Pp. 293-98.
35. P. 558.
36. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
37. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812).
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tween Jefferson and Adams. There were certainly sharp intellectual, re-
ligious, and moral differences between Adams and Jefferson, but
they were able, after more than a seven year break in personal re-
lations, to bring about the great reconciliation of America's history.
The friendship, with its exchange of letters between these two pa-
triots during the coda of their lives, is a splendid vignette in the
American annals.38 Marshall thought Jefferson was a liar, a manipula-
tor of Congress and the people for personal power, a cosmopolitan with
alien interests, and an agrarian who would hold back the consolidation
and growth of America. In his turn, Jefferson thought that Marshall
was a hypocrite who spoke for an outmoded Federalism, who used his
voice for group interests opposed to the clear majority of the elec-
torate, who sought personal power from behind the cover of a robe
rather than through a constituency, and who sought to foster the
cravings of the merchants and bankers at the expense of the yeomanry.
But the hatred transcended even these considerations. It was chemical.
In his later years, Marshall wrote a letter of advice to his grandson
in which Marshall advised the youth to read Cicero, whom Marshall
described as a great philosopher and orator. Although neither Marshall
nor Cicero was a philosopher, both were quintessential lawyers, who
usually operated in their best ranges. Both took the conservative
side and justified their positions in the name of liberty. Both sought
to uphold an independently wealthy class as a bulwark against dema-
goguery. More significantly, each sought to bring caesars, presidents,
and assemblies under the supervision of law. As an old man Cicero
was captured and beheaded by his enemies. Marshall won.
38. Sce P. WIL sTACH, CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN ADAMS AND THOMAS JEFFERSON 1812-
1826, at 11-12 (1925).
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